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When a borrowing country is reluctant to repay an international loan, the lender has few legal
remedies but can impose penalty costs that harm the borrower rather than benefit the lender. If
the lender can also temporarily· exclude the borrower from new loans, the borrower with a
sufficiently high time preference will agree to reschedule the loan. If the rescheduling condition is
met, a contract which includes a contingency for partial forgiveness can be shown to dominate a
contract without forgiveness.
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International Monetary Fund.
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PENALTIES AND EXCLUSION IN THE RESCHEDULING AND FORGI:VENESS
OF INTERNATIONAL LOANS
1. Introduction
Issues involved in intemationallending to developing countries hinge around the concept of
sovereign immunity, the long established principle of international law which provides that a
sovereign cannot be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign. It is, therefore,
extremely difficult to compel a sovereign nation to repay an external debt through purely legal
means. Extralegal sanctions, however, can be imposed on a negligent sovereign debtor, ranging
from a drop in its international credit standing to political, economic and diplomatic pressures
from the lender's national government. See Carvounis (1984). Several issues in analyzing
international lending are discussed in Eaton, Gersovitz and Stiglitz (1986).
The literature distinguishes "carrot" from "stick" incentives to avoid outright default on a
loan. The carrot is a reputational incentive. Non-default allows the country access to new loans
which may have greater present value than the repayments saved by defaulting. The stick involves
threat of punishment for default through trade sanctions or other creditor remedies. A good
discussion of these penalties can be found in Bulow and Rogoff (1989).
Our model will have both penalties and exclusion. We study how each feature can influence
the terms of an international loan when the debtor country finds itself with a debt repayment
problem. Within a simple two-period model, we derive a condition under which the country
would choose to reschedule rather than default on its loan and then show that if the condition is
met, the debtor country will be charged the world interest rate without a risk premium. This
result may help explain why lending to sovereign nations that took place in the 1970's, prior to the
debt crisis, was at interest rates very close to LIBOR. If the condition is not met, the country will
be charged a higher interest rate and will not be able to borrow as much. We also show that the
borrower for which the.rescheduling condition holds, when obtaining the initial loan, prefers tha
the lender has the capability of enforcing exclusion from the loan market if the borrower does not
reschedule the loan.
With precisely the same enforcement mechanism, the model has the further implication that
partial forgiveness of loans· under some states of nature can be part of the optimal contract and
not necessarily something that needs to be renegotiated because of events that were not foreseen
at the time of the initial loan. The condition for this arrangement to be preferred by the borrower
is actually weaker than the rescheduling condition. Therefore, as long as the rescheduling
condition is satisfied, there must exist a loan contract which incorporates partial forgiveness (in
the bad state) with rescheduling and under which the initial loan is larger than in the pure
rescheduling contract (with no foregiveness).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 explains what is meant by debt recontraCting and
discusses why both borrowers and lenders may benefit from it. In section 3 the basic model with
default is developed. A repayment problem arises when the borrowing country receives a
negative production shock and is thus unwilling to repay the loan in full. If the lender anticipates
this contingency, the interest rate on the loan will include a risk premium. If the lender can also
temporarily exclude the borrowing country from further credit, the borrower may agree to
reschedule the loan. In Section 4 we introduce the rescheduling possibility, derive a rescheduling
condition, and show how satisfying the condition can influence the interest rate charged. Section
5 introduces the contingency of forgiveness and shows that this contract dominates the contract
with rescheduling but without any forgiveness. Section 6 concludes the paper.
· ....
2. Recontracting
Outright default is a rarity in the international loan markets. Rather, when a country finds
itself facing a repayment problem, the result is almost always some form of debt recontracting.
Thus it appears that both borrowers and lenders find it in their interest to avoid a situation of
outright default
A borrowing country will find it profitable to default if the expected costs of doing so are
outweighed by the expected benefits. The borrower who defaults is subject to some form of
creditor retaliation. This retaliation may take the fonn of loss of access to international capital
markets for some time in the future, loss of access to international trade credit, lender confiscation
of borrower assets held abroad, or other fonns of general harassment from the lender. Though
the lender has this retaliatory potential when default occurs, the main result of retaliation is to
harm the borrower rather than to help the lender. The penalties inflicted on the defaulting
borrower, for the most pan, do not accrue to the creditor and hence represent a dead weight loss.
When a borrower faces a repayment problem, the lender has two choices. The first is to
continue to insist on full, timely repayment, in which case the borrower defaults and receives a
penalty, while the lender receives nothing (or close to nothing). The lender may, instead, demand
a partial repayment that leaves the borrower at least as well off as in default, in return for not
retaliating against the debtor. Clearly, both the borrowing country and the lender have an
incentive to avoid outright default
The borrowing country's motivation for repayment comes from its desire to avoid creditor
retaliation and keep access to international capital markets open in the future. The lender's
motivation to accept less than full repayment derives from its desire to avoid bad debt losses.
While both parties may have an incentive to agree to partial repayments and possible rescheduling,
the recontracting process is not straight forward. The borrower, by exploiting its default threat,
will try to make the minimum payment necessary to avoid retaliation. The lender, by exploiting its
· ,-
penalty threat, will try to extract the maximum possible payment. The terms of the recontracting
will depend upon the outcome of a bargaining game.
Much of the existing literature on sovereign-debt assumes, often implicitly, that the lender's
threat is completely credible. Bulow and Rogoff (1989) examine the implications of removing this
assumption. Using Rubinstein's (1982) bargaining model, they investigate the subgame-perfect
bargaining equilibrium that results from a country and a bank negotiating over how much of an
exogenously determined debt is to be repaid. They find a unique subgame-perfect bargaining
equilibrium which depends on the rates of time preference of both parties, the bank's ability to
impose costs on the country, and the country's tenns of trade.
In Fernandez and Rosenthal (1990), the process of debt rescheduling is modeled as a non
cooperative game built on a one-sector growth model. The debtor's motivation for repayment is
to attain an improved credit standing. They isle the question: Why should the bank be given all
the power in the debt reduction bargaining game? Both parties know that a country prefers to
repay some portion of its debt to incwring the costs of default and that lenders prefer some
payment as opposed to nothing. In the beginning of their game, the creditor forgives exactly the
amount of a pre-existing debt that makes the debtor just indifferent between two plans: (a)
ignoring the debt and optimizing in the growth model or (b) proceeding along the optimal
repayment program leading to ultimate repayment assuming no further debt forgiveness. In two
of the three models they consider, the solution in effect gives all of the bargaining power to the
lender.
In our model, we assume that the lender does have the power to extract a payment equal to
its threat capability. The loans discussed in our model are made to one country but the lender
presumably makes similar loans to other developing countries. By allowing one country to
bargain down its payment, the lender is opening itself up to similar bargaining with all other
debtors with which it is involved. Recognizing this, the lender is willing to "sacrifice" one loan to
maintain credibility in the eyes of all other debtor countries.
We also assume that the total amount of borrowing is observable and do not consider the
possibility of asymmetric information about total borrowing. Kletzer (1984) has argued that bank
lending, often through a consortium, rather than bond financing of international loans, arises
because observability is enhanced by bank lending.
3 One Period Loans with Default
As in models by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and by Sachs and Cohen (1982), a borrowing
country's production technology will be characterized by uncertainty. A loan is to be made to the
borrower at time 1 and is due at time 2. We assume that output at time 2 depends on which of
two states occurs and that a similar pattern is repeated in future periods:
yi = y* with probability I-X (good state)
= (I-e)y* with probability X (bad state)
for i = 2,3, ••• , 0 < e < 1
where yi represents output at time i, y* is the good-state production level, supply shocks occur
randomly with probability 1t, and the severity of a shock when it occurs is represented bye. We
assume as in Bulow and Rogoff (1989) that the borrowing country has a high rate of time
preference and is willing to borrow all it can to increase current consumption.
The lender in our model is risk neutral and perfectly competitive so that the expected return
from lending equals the safe rate of return, p, or what might be called the world rate of interest
In the case that the borrower defaults the lender can credibly impose on the debtor country a cost
equal to a fraction, A., of the borrowing country's national product If the amount due on the loan
.exceeds the penalty cost, the borrower is assumed, in exchange for the lender not imposing the
penalty, to repay the lender an amount equal to the penalty cost and default on the balance.
Now consider the terms on a one-period loan when default is a possible outcome. Even if
the good state occurs, the borrower might choose not to repay fully. We have assume<L however,
.. ---
that the lender can inflict a penalty of A. times total output or a total penalty cost of A.y* and that
the borrower will pay up to the penalty cost So to assure full repayment in the good state, the
lender will lend an amount that with accumulated interest will come to no more than A.y*. Since
the borrower is assumed to borrow all it can, our fIrst condition is that the total loan due after one
period equals A.y*:
(1)
where tP is the amount of the loan when there may be partial default and rD is the interest rate
charged on the loan.
If the bad state occurs, the most that the lender can expect to collect is (l-8)A.y* and the bad
state occurs with probability 1t. On the assumption that the lender sets the terms of the loan so
that the expected return on the loan equals the return on a safe asset, we have a second condition:
or, using (l),
(1+P) b D = (1-1t6)/wy*
where p is the safe rate of return.




From (1) and (3), the interest rate becomes:
arD[an > 0, > 0, arDap >0]. (4)
· ....-
Thus, the greater the probability of a negative supply shock (higher 1t) or the greater the severity
of the supply shock when it occurs (higher 8), the smaller will be the amount loaned and the
higher the risk premium in the interest rate charged. An increase in p, the lender's risk-free rate,
will cause the lender to raise the interest rate and lower the amount that can be borrowed.
Further, the stronger is the lender's ability to inflict a credible default penalty (higher A), the more
the lender will be willing to lend. The interest rate, however, is not affected by the size of the
default penalty.
Without any rescheduling considerations and on the assumption of costless monitoring of
outcomes, these same loan conditions would hold each period whether or not there are supply
shocks. If the outcome at time 3 is independent of the outcome at time 2, a risk: neutral lender
that is willing to make the loan in the first period will be willing to make the same loan in the
second period.
4. Rescheduling
Now consider an explicit two-period model in which, when the bad state occurs at time 2,
the lender is able not only to exact a payment of (l-e)Ay* but also to exclude the borrower
from the loan market in the next period if the borrower does not agree to reschedule the unpaid
balance of 9Ay*. We shall investigate when the borrower would choose to default rather than
reschedule and then examine the tenns of the loan if the borrower does choose to reschedule.
The gain to the borrowing country from rescheduling can come from the additional
consumption made possible by new loans. Suppose the borrower agrees, when the bad state
occurs at time 2, to reschedule 9Ay* for one period. The total that will be loan~ however, is
limited by the fact that the lender is unwilling to have more than Ay* come due at time 3.
Assume, as in the analysis of one-period loans with possible default, that the loan at time 2 will be
fully repaid at time 3 if the good state occurs and partially repaid if the bad state occurs. This
· "--
means that the lender will lend a total of tP as defined in (3). The additional consumption ~c2
made possible by the loan at time 2 is the difference between 1JD and the amount reschedu1e~or:
Ac2
This can be rewritten:
Ac2




The present value at time 2 to the borrower of the expected payment at time 3 is given by
PV = [l-1t]Ay* + 1tA(l-6)y*1+0
= [1-1t 8]Ay*
1+0 ( 6)
where 0 is the borrower's rate of time preference.
In order for the borrower to be willing to reschedule, the additional consumption made
possible by the new loan must be worth more than the present value of the expected payment on











The right side of (7) is less than one since the time preference of the borrowing counny is greater
than the return on a safe asset (0 > p). The inequality can therefore be satisfied if neither the
probability of a supply shock nor the severity of the shock is too large. In tenns of the severity of
the shock and using (4), this rescheduling condition can also be written as:
8 < &-p(1 +rD)(l +0) (7 • )
Thus, in order for the borrowing country to agree to reschedule, the severity of the shock if it
occurs must be at most somewhat less than the excess of the country's time preference over the





This form will be used later in our analysis of a contract with possible forgiveness.
If this rescheduling condition does not hold, then the borrower would choose to default
when the bad state occurs. The lender who knows this would offer a loan 'at time 1 on the
conditions derived in (3) and (4) in which there is a risk premium in the interest rate on the loan.
If (7) does hold, and the lender knows that the borrower will choose to reschedule when the
bad state occurs, what sort of terms would the lender set for the loan at time I? To answer this
question, let rR denote the interest rate charged on the initial loan and let })R be the size of the
loan when rescheduling is possible at time 2. As before, the amount due at time 2 is assumed not
to exceed i..y*. Therefore, if the borrowing country will borrow as much as possible:
(8)
By assumption, the expected payoff on the loan should equal the return on a safe
investment. The expected payment consists of full payment if the good state occurs with a weight
of I-x and a partial payment and a rescheduling of the balance if the bad state occurs with a
weight of x. This condition can be written as:
(l+P)bR = (l-X)Ay* + 1t[(1-8)Ay* + 8AY*] ( 9)
· "--
The last term in brackets needs additional explanation. If the bad state occurs at time 2, the
borrower will pay back (1-e)AY*, reschedule eAY*, and receive a new loan of .6.c2 as shown in
(5). With its threat capability assming at least partial repayment and by.limiting its exposure, the
lender's expected rate of return on any rescheduled loan at time 2 is p. Therefore, the rescheduled
amount of eAY* at time 2 has a present value to the lender of eAy*.
The right side of (9) can be simplified so that:
(l+P) b R = Ay*
A comparison of (8) and (9') reveals that
(9 I )
l+rR = l+p (10)
The country that can be counted on to reschedule will in this model get the world rate of interest
without a risk premium.
The possibility of rescheduling when bad states occur may have some relevance for the small
risk premiums that have been observed in the past. Over the period just preceding the onset of
the debt crisis, spreads over LIBOR were not a major element in the cost of developing country
external borrowing. For all developing countries, the spreads over LIBOR for external borrowing
averaged 1.36 (in percent per annum) in the second half of the 1970's. For the typical
industrialized country in the same period, the spreads averaged 0.83. Thus, a developing country
could access the external market for funds at a cost of only about one-half of one percentage
point more than the typical industrialized country. See the World Development Report (1980).
With no further rescheduling, the borrower would at time 3 either repay fully if the good
state occurs or make partial payment and default on the balance if the bad state occurs. In that
case, the interest rate charged to a country which reschedules would rise from p at time 1 to rD at
time 2.
We can also show that the borrower prefers at time 1 for the lender to have the capability to
exclude the borrower from the loan market at time 2 if the rescheduling condition (7') is known to
• ie.._
hold. To see this, consider the alternatives of (a) borrowing tP at a rate rD at both time 1 and
time 2 and defaulting on eAy· whenever the bad state occurs or (b) borrowing })R at the safe rate
of interest at time 1 but agreeing to reschedule eAy* if the bad state occurs at time 2. In (b), the
borrower gets more initially but receives less at time 2 when the bad state occurs. The loan under
rescheduling at time 1 exceeds the loan under partial default by:
AY* ..:.[_l-_X_e~]_A~y_* __ xeAY*b R - bD = -- -l+p l+p l+p (11 )
If the bad state occurs at time 2, the borrower gets eAy* less in loans under the rescheduling
option than under the default option because eAy* is the amount that would be rescheduled.
Since the bad state occurs with probability x and is discounted by the borrower to time 1 at a




Since Bis greater than p, the gain to the borrower from the rescheduling option, shown in (11), is
greater than the present value of the expected loss, shown in (12). Thus, the borrower prefers the
rescheduling option at time 1. The rescheduling condition (7) serves as an incentive compatibility
constraint so that at time 2, the borrower will actually prefer to reschedule rather than be
excluded from the loan market.
5. Forgiveness
With precisely the same enforcement mechanism assumed in our analysis of rescheduling, the
model has an additional implication that both rescheduling and forgiveness can be pan of the
optimal contract. This result.can be developed by first introducing the possibility that the
borrower be allowed to reschedule even when the good state occurs at time 2 and ask what is the
maximum that the borrower would be willing to reschedule.
As before, assume that the maximum loan that the lender will extend at time 2 is bD, given
by equation (3). If R is the amount rescheduled, then the amount of new consumption possible at
time 2 is:
l1c2 = (l-xe)Ay* _ R
l+p
In order for the borrower to be willing to reschedule at time 2, this has to be at least as great as
the present value at time 2 to the borrower of the expected repayment at time 3. This was given
by PV in equation (6) above. The condition .1c2 ~ PV, can be written:
(l-xe) Ay* (1-7t9)AY*
l+p - R ~ 1+0
or
1 1R S (- - -) (1-7t9)Ay*
1+p 1+0
The maximum amount that could be rescheduled is therefore
R = (1+Pi1+0) (1-7t9)Ay* (13)
Now consider what the terms of the initial loan would be if R as given by equation (13) were
rescheduled at time 2. The amount that comes due at time 2 cannot exceed Ay* + R. In the good
state, AY* is the maximum payment that the creditor can extract from the borrower and R is the
· ....
maximum that can be rescheduled. Assuming the borrower wants to borrow as much as possible
at time 1, the terms of the loan can be represented by the following equation:
(14)
where rF is the interest rate charged and J>F is the amount lent at time 1 when there may be some
forgiveness.
If the bad state occurs at time 2, the lender can obtain a payment of only A (1-9) y * .
Under these circumstances, the unpaid balance (U) on the loan when the bad state occurs will be
From (14) and (15), we have
U = R + A9y*
(15)
(16)
and A9y* is the amount that must be forgiven in order to induce the debtor to reschedule.
Note that the lender's expected rate of return on R at time 2 is p, the world rate of interest.
Thus, a loan of R at time 2 has a present value of R to the creditor. At time 1, the risk neutral
creditor requires that the expected return on the initial loan be equal to p. This can be represented
by:
(l+P)bF = (1-1t) (Ay* + R) + 1t[(1-9)AY* + R] (17)
Recall that 1t denotes the probability that the bad state occurs. In either state, R will be
rescheduled at time 2, but less will be repaid if the bad state occurs and some of the loan has to be
forgiven. Equation (17) simplifies to
(l+P)bF = (1-1t9)AY* + R




If there is to be a contract with the contingency of some forgiveness of the loan when the bad
state occurs, then the interest rate on the loan must have a risk premium to compensate the lender
for the possibility of forgiving part of the debt
By substituting for R from (13) in (18) we can solve for the size of the initial loan. The
result is:
F §-p (1-x6)A.y*b = [1 + J(1+p)(1+0) l+p (20)
We need to compare the size of the initial loan under forgiveness (bF) with the size of the loan
under rescheduling without forgiveness (lJR) given by equation (9'). t>F can be shown to be larger
than 1JR when:
&-p 1t6
>(1+p)(1+0) 1-1t6 (21 )
This is a weaker condition than the rescheduling condition, as can be seen most clearly when the
rescheduling condition is expressed as in (7"). Since there is some probability that the good state
will occur (x < 1), the right side of (7") is strictly greater than the right side of (21). In other
words, if the borrower can be counted on to reschedule, then the initial loan will be larger under
the contract with forgiveness than without forgiveness.
To see if the borrower actually prefers the contract with forgiveness, the following two
alternatives must be compared: (1) borrowing bR at (l + p) at time I and rescheduling 6A.y* at
time 2 if the bad state occurs or (2) borrowing J)F at (1 + rF) at time 1 and rescheduling R at time
2 no matter which state occurs. Defming A and B as the debtor's utility under the flI"St and second




= (l-1tB)Ay* [(l+P)(l+O)J [(l+P)(l+O) - l-xe J · (22)
The derivation of (22) is shown in the Appendix. Qearly, B - A is positive if the last term in
brackets in (22) is positive. We know, from our discussion of the condition (21) for the initial
loan to be larger under forgiveness than without forgiveness, that the term will be positive
whenever the borrower can be counted on to reschedule.
Therefore, a loan contract in which forgiveness is a possibility dominates one in which there
may be rescheduling without any forgiveness. There is, however, now a risk premium in the
initial loan to compensate the lender for the possibility of some forgiveness.
6 . Concl.usion
In our model of international loans, when a lender can extract a payment from the borrower
equal to the penalty cost for default, we find that the risk premium added to the world interest
rate is larger the greater the probability that a bad state will occur and the greater the severity of
the supply shock when the bad state does occur.
If the lender can also exclude the borrower from international loans unless the borrower
agrees to a rescheduling when a bad state occurs, the borrower will agree to the rescheduling
when the anticipated severity of the supply shock is not too large relative to the excess of the
borrower's rate of time preference over the world interest rate. The key here is that the value of
the new loan to the borrower exceeds the present value of paying back the total (rescheduled and
new) loans.
With precisely the same penalty and exclusion enforcement mechanism assumed for the
rescheduling result, a contract in which the lender will have to forgive pan of the loan if the bad
state occurs acOlally dominates the contract without forgiveness. While much of the real-world
forgiveness of international debts may have arisen because of contingencies that were not
· ....-
anticipated at the time the loans were extended, our results indicate that forgiveness can be part of
a fully contingent contract. In an analysis of the relative advantages of floating-rate and fixed-rate
debt, Detragiache (1992) drops the assumption that contracts are perfectly enforceable when
assessing why sovereign loans are often not repaid in full. In effect, this happens in our model.
Forgiveness arises as a contingency in which the lender cannot exact enough in penalties for the
borrower to be willing to make full repayment, and the risk premium covers this contingency. If
there are risk premia, even if very small, then as Calvo (1989, p. 190) comments, "debt contracts
may not have ruled out debt relief."
If one wanted to relax our assumption that the lender can extract a payment up to the
penalty cost, then the terms of the loan would have to reflect this. If the borrower can bargain
away some of its prior commitment when bad states occur, then lenders, knowing this, would
presumably offer less favorable terms and include more of a risk premium in the initial loan when
some default is possible. One could also extend the number of periods over which the lender can
inflict penalties, and thereby increase the size of the initial loan, or introduce other complications
in the assumed enforcement mechanism. Our simple model allows us to focus on the importance
of exclusion, together with penalties, in inducing rescheduling and in allowing forgiveness to be a
contingency in the original contract.
· ,-
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Appendix
Penalties and Exclusion in the Rescheduling and Forgiveness of International Loans
Derivation of expression (22).
From (20) and (9') in the text, the loan under forgiveness (with rescheduling) exceeds the loan








This is the added consumption in the fIrst period made possible by the loan with forgiveness.
The cost of this additional liquidity is a lower inflow of loans in the second period. Under
the rescheduling loan, the debtor receives a new loan of the amound t>D if the good state occurs
and t>D - SAy* if the bad state occurs (with probability x). Under forgiveness the loan in the
second period is t>D - R no matter which state occurs.. The additional expected loss in second
period consumption under the forgiveness option is therefore R - 7t6Ay*, or using (13) in the text:
(l+p)(l+B) (1-x9)Ay*- 7t9)"y* (A.2)
The first-period gain to the debtor from the forgiveness option (A.I) exceeds the present value of
the second-period loss, (A.2) discounted at the rate B, if and only if:
(1-1t9»)"y* &-p 7tE) (l-7tE)).,y* &-p 7tE)
l+p [(l+P)(l+B) - 1-7tE)] - l+B [(l+p)(l+B) - 1-1t9] > 0 (A.3)
This simplifies to:
(A. 4)x9--] > o.
1-1tS
1 §-p
(1 +B)] [ (1 +p)(l +B)
1(l-1tS»)"y * [ )(l+p
Expression (A.4) is equivalent to (22) in the text.
